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The argument is the following. First, national statistics have been supplemented by European statistics, hence statistics are being Europeanized.
Numerical information has become increasingly important in EU decisionmaking. Over the past fifty years there has been a rapid growth in European statistics. European statistics are distributed more widely, are more frequently used, and are generating increased attention. The more extensive use of numerical information is important for the functioning of the EU, and it also plays an important part in increasing the democratic quality of European governance.
Second, over time, there has been a process of gradual institutionalization of the European information system. A separate body, Eurostat, has emerged as a key actor. Rules and procedures have been established, and resources have been linked to upholding these rules and practices. Networks of training and cooperation between European and national bodies have been established. Although the role of Eurostat has been disputed and questioned, it has gradually developed some degree of autonomy and found a place within the larger European institutional configuration. Third, the processes of institution building have followed some of the well-known dynamics of European integration, such as the functional logic of task expansion, technical problem-solving, as well as bargaining between parties with different national traditions and standardized routines. However, a striking feature of Eurostat is the importance of pre-existing forms of organized co-operation, and in particular, the importance of the close interrelationship and organized co-operation with national statistical institutes, as well as international statistical bodies such as the OECD and the UN.
The discussion is organized as follows: First, some of the properties of informational systems and some theoretical approaches to statistical system will be discussed. I then provide a more detailed empirical analysis of the development of the statistical system in Europe, and the relationship between national statistical institutes and Eurostat. Needless to say, the issue of statistics in Europe is largeranging from the low-attention, refined and highly specialized discussions on methods and modes of measurement, to the high-attention decisions, for instance, determining which states may qualify for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union. In this chapter, the focus is restricted to issues related to the institutional developments of Eurostat and the question of administering information systems.
Statistics and political systems
Most political scientists are consumers of statistics. Few have been interested in seeing information and statistics as a component part of the emerging political system of Europe. Why should we be concerned about statistics? There are two kinds of responses to this. The first reason relates to key properties of numerical information systems, which should be of particular interest to students of European governance, while the second reason relates to theories of institutions.
Numerical information systems, such as statistics and accounting, have some properties that make them particularly interesting to study in Europe. As the EU has become larger and more complex, the need for information enabling comparisons has increased. Compared with textual information, figures are particularly effective in reducing complexities and enabling comparisons.
Numerical information also seems to affect the value and trust attached to the information. In general, numerical information tends to signal objectivity to a greater extent than textual information, so it often generates more trust (Porter 1995) . In the EU, the lack of a common language makes textual information even more difficult and costly. Finding solutions to overcome the technical, cultural, economic and democratic difficulties related to the many European languages has proven difficult, but numerical information creates a form of communicating across fairly heterogeneous member states. In the EU there is a 'culture of no culture', and in the creation of a unified political and administrative system the 'neutral' language of quantification may therefore prove to be particularly important. Finally, numerical information is a key component of the norm of rationality. Modern societies are characterized by the ubiquity of numerical information, as reflected in the saying, 'what you can't count, doesn't count'. For instance, in modern public administration we observe an 'audit society' characterized by the spread of scoreboards, benchmarking and auditing, etc. (Power 1994) . These general developments in public administration are also frequently found in the European Union, where we can note the spread of softer governance techniques related to the open method of co-ordination, as well as the increased use of scoreboards to measure performance, convergence and goal achievements. This ubiquity of numerical information, as well as its particular significance in the EU, makes it interesting to examine the organization of statistics.
The second motivation for examining statistics follows from the lessons from an institutional and organizational perspective on politics. In the literature we can identify different perspectives on how to perceive and view statistical systems. Some see statistics as a neutral, a-political and technical activity of simply mirroring society. From such a view, changes in the statistical systems are likely to derive from technical advancements, or that changes in society lead statisticians to measure new areas and policy fields. Others see statistics as a political tool for realizing political aims and ambitions. The famous aphorism attributed to Benjamin Disraeli that 'there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics' reflects the view that statistical categories and measures are designed to organize support for distinct alternatives. Numerous studies have shown how the ideal of letting neutral information determine politics can be reversed or perverted, making policies determine data, and there is a huge literature on different versions of 'creative accounting' among both private and public actors (Hopwood and Miller 1994) . From such an instrumental perspective, changes in the statistical systems are seen as stemming from the changing preferences of the political leaders or changing coalitions of leaders.
However, statistics can also be seen primarily as an institutional practice (March and Olsen 1989; March and Olsen 1995) . Figures and statistical systems can be seen as institutions, which, like other political institutions, mobilize bias (Schattschneider 1960 , Sangolt 1997 . The basic assumption is that the way an institution is organized has implications for how it works. Information serves different purposes, and different information systems can be designed for securing different goals and purposes. Such goals may include maximizing effective decision-making in the European institutions, maximizing the democratic ideal of informing the public and the citizens, and maximising trust among actors in competitive markets. Sometimes goals and purposes are in conflict with each other. For instance, while secrecy and privileged access to information may sometimes be important for effective decision-making, it can be in conflict with informing the ordinary citizens. Issues such as what to measure, when to measure, who to measure, are not only pure technical decisions, they are also political decisions that can have distributional consequences.
From an institutional perspective it is assumed that different organizational principles skew decision-making in distinct directions. Moreover, it is argued that statistical systems, like institutions in general, often evolve in a path-dependent way. Decisions at time zero create opportunities and constraints for decisionmaking at a later stage. Perhaps more so than other institutions, statistical systems are conservative: they create and represent the present in the categories of the past. Partly they do so because the effectiveness of statistics is often based upon comparability in space and time, and change in statistical categories reduces the possibilities for comparisons 1 removed, there emerged a need for new modes of collecting data, since in many instances border controls had provided essential data-collection points.
Second, having new and harmonized statistics was critical for financing the activities of the EU. Since the financial contributions to the budget by the various member states are calculated on the basis of aggregated measures of GNI, it was important to ensure that these economic parameters were measured similarly in the various member states. Similarly, the basic element of redistribution is also heavily dependent upon methods and modes of determining which states, regions, groups and persons are entitled to receive support from the EU through its various polices and programmes 5 .
Finally, the emergence of European statistics is also linked to the development of some notions of European identities, or at least enabling citizens to learn more about their fellow Europeans and how they live. The policy of dissemination of statistics has made evident the linkage between statistics and democracy in the EU. For instance, the preface to the first version of the European statistical yearbook, published in 1995, explained that this was a book 'for and about the Europeans', stressing its importance in developing knowledge and trust by enabling its citizens to get to know their 'European neighbours just a little better' (Eurostat 1995:i) . The yearbook was also intended to link democracy and statistics more closely, seeing the role of European statistics as serving the people so that 'democracy may flourish'.
European integration has challenged the borders of the nation-state in general, and the statistical boundaries and the organization of the statistical information in particular. In order to develop the EU into a full-blown polity, it has become evident that creating a political space both involves and enables the creation of a space of common measurement, within which things may be compared, on the basis of identical categories and encoding procedures (Desrosières 1998:8-9) . This need for statistical co-operation in the EU has been an integral part of European integration since the very start of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.
In Article 46 of the ESCS Treaty the objectives which presuppose the availability of statistics were expressed, and in Article 47 it was stated that the High Authority may obtain the information it required to carry out its task. When As we see from Figure 7 .1, the growth has taken place stepwise, rather than incrementally. The stages of growth correspond roughly to the addition of new statistical tasks. For instance, the increase in the early 1960s was primarily related to the merging of treaties and the expansion of statistical fields. Since the mid1990s it has been related to the introduction of the internal market and later especially the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which increased the demand for statistics and gave Eurostat the role of monitoring some of the convergence criteria. Although there has been a significant growth in the staff of Eurostat, it still is remarkably small compared to its counterparts at the national level 6 . The total staffs of the statistical institutes of the EU 15 were calculated to approximately 70,000 in 1998 7 .
Eurostat and its role in the institutional configuration of the EU There has been a shared understanding of the need for a solid informational foundation of European integration, but the organizational structure of Eurostat and its role in the larger institutional configuration have been contested and disputed over the years.
Eurostat has never been an independent agency: it is organized as a This formulation stated explicitly the dual administrative system that was emerging. On the one hand, the national bodies were seen as the statistical institutions of the member states; on the other hand, they were also encouraged to see themselves as an integral part of the emerging European administrative sphere fulfilling community tasks. In the absence of a legal framework establishing clear priorities, as well as few resources for European statistics, co-operation has at times been problematic. In addition to the national-level frustrations caused by the extra workload involved in producing European statistics, one recurrent controversial issue was secrecy.
Member states were reluctant to give data to Eurostat, fearing that the data could be used by the European Commission or that confidential information could be spread. Over time and with increased interaction among member states, such concerns about secrecy have been reduced. As indicated, Eurostat has conflicting roles regarding national statistical institutes. On the one hand, it acts as networker and co-operator; on the other hand, it also serves as judge. It is a judge when making decisions on the whether or not to accept the figures published by the various member states. This role came to the forefront in the period when the EMU was launched. Indicators such as public debt, interest rates, exchange rate fluctuations and the balance of payments were to be monitored, and states that failed to meet the initial targets would not qualify for membership in the EMU. The criteria on public deficit and inflation were the subject of monitoring by the European statistical system.
Eurostat was suddenly given the role of providing the information necessary for determining which states that could qualify for EMU membership or not -a daunting task for a small institution.
In order to handle this work, Eurostat introduced two instruments. First, it
proposed the creation of a harmonized index of consumer prices (until then, member states had measured inflation differently); and second, the introduction of a new accounting scheme called European Standardized Accounts (ESA), an elaborated version of a UN standard for accounting. Although the introduction of these instruments was of technical character, they had significant political consequences as well, since these statistical methods eventually affect economic performance and market evaluations. Some national decision-makers were slow in implementing the new and improved standards. For instance, Dieter Glatzel, head of the Eurostat unit responsible for the excessive deficit procedure, argued that the delay was a result of the economic situation in the member states, and feared that the introduction of a new standard could tilt the creation of the EMU. He argued that the '[b] ackground to the delay in applying ESA 95 to the excessive deficit procedure was the economic situation in 1994-95. At that time very few countries were able to achieve or improve on the reference values laid down in the Protocol: 60 per cent for ratio of government debt to GDP and 3 per cent for ratio of government deficit to GDP' (Glatzel 1999 (Blakemore and McKeever 2001) , however, showed that Eurostat, like most disseminators of official statistics, had various problems: it had little control over the data supply chain, and user-groups were mixed, with differing expectations and needs. In order to meet these occasionally conflicting demands, Eurostat must balance access rights against data protection, harmonization against specificity, as well as manage to secure the resources for producing statistics, while also providing free access for the ordinary citizen.
Integrated figure
As we have seen, numerical information is becoming increasingly important in European governance. The expanding EU agenda has triggered an increased use of numerical information in order to reduce complexity and ease comparisons.
The growing use of numerical information in the EU is also an important element in enhancing the democratic quality of European governance, since it enable citizens to evaluate and hold politicians accountable. European statistics can also be seen as one of several instruments for developing European self-understandings and even the creation of a shared (numerical) language. As indicated in this chapter, the processes of building statistics and statistical institutions in the European Union have several similarities with the development of statistical institutions in the era of state-and nation-building.
Over the past few decades, Eurostat has become institutionalized. It has gradually developed rules, principles and capacities, as well as some degree of autonomy, and has found its place in the larger European institutional configuration. There is a clear path-dependency in the incremental development, but at different times Eurostat has been exposed to more radical reform attempts, some of them only partly related to the field of statistics as such. The 'living' institution has evolved through processes of mutual adjustments and a variety of patterns of co-operation -not so much by grand design and 'treaty revisions', as through the long-term involvement and commitment of professional statisticians, as well as the gradual utilization and cultivation of pre-existing national and international institutions. As a result of these developments, a multi-level system of governance in European statistics has emerged. National statistical institutes are central in this system of double-hatted administration. They operate within the boundaries of the nation-state serving national-level tasks and purposes, but in addition, they are key elements in the European administration. The extensive co-operation is the result of the division of labour between the two levels, much the same as with the implementation of ordinary legislation. In the field of statistics, co-operation has also been stimulated by the establishment of organized systems for training and exchange of staffs. So far, we know little about the potential tensions built into this kind of multi-level system, or how the different roles, responsibilities and tasks are balanced and fulfilled in instances of conflict or political pressure.
The growth in European statistics has only partly been met by a corresponding increase in the staffing and budgets of the statistical authority.
There has been an imbalance between ambitious tasks and limited capacity.
Attempts have been made to bridge this gap by the division of labour, extensive exchange of personnel with national-level institutions, the introduction of new technologies, and close co-operation and utilization of pre-existing forms of international co-operation. All the same, Eurostat officials have argued that 'politicians tend to think that statistics can be produced for no money out of thin air' 13 . This was particularly so in relation to the EMU, where there was a pressing need for additional resources to produce reliable statistics within extremely tight deadlines. One consequence of the limited resources, European statisticians sometimes argued, was that 'there may not be high-quality data available' 14 .
So far, the European Union has produced data that have been trusted. An increasing numbers of actors and decision-makers use EU data as information sources, and the data contribute to shape perceptions of Europe and Europeans. 
